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Introduction (1)
People say that Chinese politics is impenetrable. But in 1975-76, poli-tics in Beijing took place on university campuses and in plain view inTiananmen Square. The launching of a “big character poster com-
pound” (dazibao qu 大字报区) at Peking University (hereafter Beida) in mid-
November gave foreign students a front row seat to the polemical attacks
authorised by Mao Zedong against Deng Xiaoping and his allies who previ-
ously, with Mao’s blessing, had mounted a mini-reform movement in sum-
mer-fall 1975. Responding to the death of Premier Zhou Enlai on 9 January
1976, some Beijing citizens brought wreaths to Tiananmen Square and pub-
licly expressed deep anguish at the passing of their beloved Zongli 总理
(Prime Minister). By the third week of February, Deng’s political days were
numbered, but despite Mao’s hesitancy to denounce him by name in the
posters as the “biggest capitalist roader within the Party” (dangnei zuida de
zouzipai 党内最大的走资派), CCP radicals running Tsinghua and Peking uni-
versities brightly festooned Deng’s name on the posters in an attempt to
propel the “Criticise Deng Xiaoping Campaign” (Pi Deng yundong批邓运动)
out of the campuses and a limited number of cities, such as Shanghai and
Beijing, and blaze it across the country. 
But Zhou Enlai’s post-1972 efforts to improve the economy and undermine
the radicals, intensified by Deng in 1975, had found favour in the eyes of Bei-
jingers. So, on 4 April, during the Qingming Festival, a traditional time when
Chinese sweep the graves of their beloved departed, as many as two million
people visited Tiananmen Square, bringing wreaths and poems, and making
speeches in the largest unauthorised protest in Beijing since the anti-Rightist
Campaign of 1957. Fearful of a radical victory, they expressed support for the
spirit of Zhou and their opposition to the radicals (and perhaps Mao).
The photos presented here portray four “acts” in the political drama run-
ning between 20 November 1975 and 5 April 1976. Two sets of photos pres-
ent the establishment of the big character poster compound at Beida, which
I visited regularly at that time, and how the radicals used posters to promote
the “Criticise Deng Xiaoping Campaign” in February 1976. A third set shows
the mourning that took place on 10 January 1976 in Tiananmen Square fol-
lowing the death of Zhou Enlai, while the final and most dramatic set shows
the events in Tiananmen Square on 3-4 April, what is now known as the
Tiananmen Incident of 1976, and also as the April Fifth Movement.
For 40 years I used these photos for teaching but never shared them with
the world at large. Since I did not want to write a book on the period, I was
unsure how to display them. Several months ago, I attached the photo of
the mass of people in the square (the photo on the cover of this issue) to a
conversation with some colleagues in an online chatroom about current
affairs in China, and the response was electric. Everyone wanted me to get
them out, particularly as the 40th anniversary of the April Fifth Movement
was pending. So I approached Sebastian Veg, then director of the French
Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), with the idea of dis-
playing them in a photo essay in China Perspectives. I chose this outlet for
several reasons: CEFC’s Hong Kong location allowed us to work face-to-
face; China Perspectives can produce colour photos, and I wanted to show
my shots in their original colour; and finally, as a member of the editorial
board, I wanted to support the journal.
I shot the photos with an old but very nice Minolta camera. On the dank,
drizzly Saturday before Qingming, I used black and white film, which cap-
tured the sombre sense of the square that day. Fortunately I switched to
Kodak colour film for the Qingming festival the next day.
These events occurred long ago, and many in the China field know little
about this period. I’ll therefore begin with some political background to the
events and the photos, drawing primarily on my article in The China Quar-
terly, (2) written when I was a PhD student at the University of Michigan,
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the remarkable work of Fred Tiewes and Warren Sun, (3) the report of Genny
and Kam Louie about events in Nanjing, (4) Ann Fenwick’s doctoral disserta-
tion, (5) an excellent book by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoen-
hals, (6) and an older book by Roger Garside, who also observed first-hand
the events of 3 and 4 April, those remarkable days in Tiananmen Square 40
years ago. (7)
Background to the events of November
1975 - April 1976
Following the death of defence Minister Lin Biao in 1971, politics in China
moderated significantly, as Zhou Enlai, supported by a host of senior cadres,
introduced in 1972 what must be seen as a “Rightist counter-current.” New
policies challenged the Cultural Revolution and contributed to the conflicts
of 1975-76. Universities were reopened, science and technology was reem-
phasised, and more than three million officials pushed out during the Cultural
Revolution were “rehabilitated,” including Deng Xiaoping, the highest ranking
CCP leader purged by Mao who remained alive. Their return placed great
pressure on “revolutionary rebels” who had taken authority at the local level,
often through violent attacks on established cadres, and the rebels’ efforts
to keep power in the face of a counter-attack by rehabilitated cadres trig-
gered factional battles, distracting attention from economically productive
work. 
Nevertheless, until his death, Mao Zedong engaged in a type of policy
schizophrenia; on the one hand, he wanted China to prosper economically,
scientifically and culturally, and knew that “stability and unity” (anding 
tuanjie 安定团结) were imperative to building a strong China; hence, his
deep hostility towards factionalism. Yet, he could not jettison his dream for
China to balance pro-development policies with the “anti-revisionist” poli-
cies he had introduced during the Cultural Revolution and which he believed
would save China from the same fate as the Soviet Union. (8) These policies
included maintaining “class struggle” as the driving force of all politics and
keeping politics, not economics, as the sine qua non of all policy decisions;
preventing the education of a new class of bourgeois intellectuals within
China's universities; and most important, preventing the re-emergence of
an inner core of CCP leaders who would use their authority to become a
new ruling class, a bourgeoisie within the Party who would take China back
down the path to a capitalist society. 
Hence, as the photos show, Mao manipulated the politics of 1975-76. (9)
While in the summer of 1975, he let Deng draft a series of policy proposals,
in the fall, he encouraged the criticism of these documents in big character
posters at Tsinghua and Beida. When Zhou Enlai died, Mao limited popular
mourning, angering society. In February 1976, Mao let Deng be attacked in-
directly in the posters, and in April, he approved the use of violence to quell
the unrest in Tiananmen Square.
Deng’s return to the apogee of power, 
April 1973 - July 1975
Mao had always liked Deng, convinced of his administrative skills and po-
litical toughness. (10) So, once Zhou Enlai’s illness forced Mao to find a suc-
cessor to the Premier, and essentially to himself, he brought Deng back to
Beijing in 1973 and quickly bestowed on him all the trappings of political
authority. Deng quickly became Army Chief of Staff, soon thereafter re-
joined the Politburo and Military Affairs Commission, and in January 1975
was promoted to Vice-Chairman of the CCP. From July to October 1975, he
dominated all policy making within the leadership. 
Still, Deng’s return complicated leadership politics in China. A deep policy
and power chasm separated Deng and his allies from those whom Mao
would soon label the “Gang of Four.” In 1974, to weaken Zhou Enlai, stop
him from rehabilitating more old cadres and block his reform efforts, the lat-
ter group launched the “Criticise Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign” (Pi Lin
Pi Kong yundong 批林批孔运动), which had a major impact across many
sectors of Chinese society. Political tension also existed between Deng’s team
and the moderate victors of the Cultural Revolution, such as Hua Guofeng,
Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian and Chen Yonggui, who had filled the slots of
top leaders deposed during the Cultural Revolution. But the primary battle
line was among these latter two groups and the radicals, including Jiang Qing,
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, (11) Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi
(who ran Tsinghua University), and Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin, who became
Mao’s eyes and ears in late 1975. These radicals resisted Deng’s reforms and
utilised Mao’s concerns about Deng to undermine his program.
Second, while Mao supported Deng’s efforts to rebuild China’s stagnant
economy, develop science, and end factionalism at all levels of the political
system, the Chairman feared that Deng was not committed to protecting
the heritage of the Cultural Revolution. So, as soon as Deng advocated poli-
cies that negated core elements of the Cultural Revolution, particularly
those related to education, Mao first criticised Deng and then again stripped
him of all power. 
Still, for three months, from July to October 1975, Mao side-lined the
Politburo radicals for incessant factional activities and gave Deng Xiaoping
total control of the government, the Party and the army. During this period,
Deng and his coterie of veteran cadres promoted a “consolidation” (zheng-
dun整顿) program. To develop reform proposals, in early July, Deng estab-
lished a new State Council Political Research Office, staffed by his lieu-
tenants, including Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, who drafted
three reform documents. As Mao requested, Deng and Ji Dengkui attacked
factionalism across the country, arresting many “revolutionary rebels” who
had come to power violently during the Cultural Revolution. Factionalism
in Zhejiang Province was a major target in summer 1975. Deng also de-
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manded that all officials “take his three policy documents as the key link”
(yi san xiang zhishi wei gang以三项指示为纲) and encouraged the Minister
of Education, Zhou Rongxin, to draft a document on educational reform,
advocating an end to “open door schooling” (kai men ban xue 开门办学),
(whereby college students spent several months a year engaged in practical
onsite activities), group rather than individual exams, admission standards
that no longer depended largely on recommendations from work units, and
a greater focus on academic studies. This document, begun in September,
might have been included as a fourth reform document had the “Big Debate
on Education” not been launched. (12)
Education policy was highly relevant to the photos presented here and
was a highly sensitive policy issue. Education involved ideology and the
training of Mao’s generation of “revolutionary successors.” For the Chairman,
privileged college students must not be alienated from the masses and pro-
ductive labour. Second, by challenging the Cultural Revolution’s “new-born
socialist things” (xin sheng shiwu 新生事物), many of which were linked to
education, Deng revealed to Mao his intention to overturn many policies
from that era and reinforced Mao’s fear that Deng had never actually
changed his world view. Third, ideology and education was Zhang Chun-
qiao’s turf, who was the Vice-Premier holding the education portfolio, (13) so
compared to the other arenas Deng wanted to rectify, this one invaded the
territory of a leading radical. 
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang faced a similar dilemma during the 1980s
reform decade, when they tried to balance “reform and opening” (gaige
kaifang 改革开放), with its inherent liberal tendencies in economics and
politics, and the “Four Cardinal Principles” (si xiang jiben yuanze 四项基本
原则), which emphasised the CCP’s dominance, the Proletarian Dictatorship
(state coercion), the Socialist Road (public property), and Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong Thought. Hu and Zhao’s emphasis on political reform over
CCP dictatorship contributed to the ideological incoherence of the 1980s
and the incompatible visions of China’s future that erupted in Tiananmen
Square in 1989. And just as they failed, largely because Deng opposed sig-
nificant political reform, Deng’s earlier effort in 1975 to combine reforms
in education, personnel, the economy, and science and technology, all the
while preserving the heritage of the Cultural Revolution, was impossible
even for the politically astute Deng so long as Mao remained ultimately in
charge. Political snipping by the radicals eventually turned Mao against
Deng. As these pictures show, in a precursor to 1989, Chinese society, hungry
for change, braved the wrath of the Party-state by rallying in support of the
reformer(s) at Tiananmen Square in April 1976. 
Deng’s program under attack, fall 1975
Deng’s position was undermined for various reasons. Essentially he over-
played his hand, trying to revamp national development in a direction
counter to the Cultural Revolution. While he thought Mao was on board, it
did not take much for Mao to bail out on him. Deng’s position was con-
stantly being undermined by Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin, who resented
Zhou Rongxin’s attack on the Chaoyang Educational Model, established by
the younger Mao himself in Liaoning Province. Mao Yuanxin admitted that
he began to put anti-Deng ideas in his uncle’s head in late September and
had clearly caught his attention by mid-October. (14)
Also in October, a vice Party secretary of Tsinghua University, Liu Bing,
wrote a letter to Mao that challenged the overall direction of education
policy as well as Chi Qun, Chairman of Tsinghua’s Revolutionary Committee,
and Xie Jingji, a vice Party secretary of Tsinghua, and a leading radical to
whom Mao was quite close and protective. (15) While Mao Zedong had cho-
sen to ignore Liu’s first letter written in July, he decided that this second
one was a broadside against the Cultural Revolution.
Mao responded on 3 November when Wu De, Party Secretary of Beijing,
presented Mao’s critique of Liu Bing’s letters at a conference at Tsinghua
University chaired by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, the targets of Liu’s letters.
Zhang Chunqiao weighed in as well; five days later he directly criticised
Zhou Rongxin’s education policies to his face. On 15 and 16 November, at
an expanded Politburo meeting at Tsinghua ironically chaired by a silent
Deng, Liu Bing was forced to make a self-criticism, while Deng’s two lieu-
tenants, Hu Yaobang and Hu Qiaomu, were asked to explain why they had
passed the letters to Mao. The uptick of the meeting was the Politburo’s de-
cision to turn the attack on Zhou Rongxin into a campaign to oppose what
was now called a “wind of Rightist reversal” (youqing fan’an feng 右倾反安
风), which the radicals claimed Deng had begun in the summer under his
“consolidation” policy. (16)
The big debate on the “revolution in education”
brings on the posters 
As chair of the meetings, Chi Qun on 18 and 19 November launched the
“Big Debate on the Revolution in Education” (jiaoyu geming da bianlun教
育革命大辩论) and the struggle against the “wind of Rightist reversal.” At
this meeting, Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin, who as Mao’s major conduit to
the outside world could claim to speak for the Chairman, made it clear that
Mao Zedong saw this “wind of Rightist reversal” as part of the “two-line
struggle” whose real target was to overthrow the Cultural Revolution. (17)
Emboldened by this meeting, the radicals turned Tsinghua and Beida into
what Fenwick called “activation points,” (18) through which they circum-
vented the Politburo and publicly aired their conflict with Deng Xiaoping
and his “consolidation” campaign. Thus on 20 November, a “big character
poster” compound was set up at Tsinghua University, (19) with one set up at
Peking University the following day. At Beida, the compound was situated
in a large square surrounded by four large dormitories, an easy walk to the
major dining hall and the shops. (20) Straw mats, wrapped around poles,
formed the walls (Photo 1). The only entrance was guarded round the clock
by both faculty and students who carried billy clubs to defend against so-
called “class enemies” who might disrupt the campaign. Students were or-
ganised into “criticism groups” (pipan zu 批判组), who then wrote posters
attacking Zhou Rongxin’s summer speeches and Deng’s “consolidation” ef-
fort. My roommate, the class leader of the second year students in the Phi-
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Photo 1 – The character posters courtyard at Peking University.  
© David Zweig
Photo 2 – Pasting up posters at Peking University: 
November 1975, the early attack. © David Zweig
Photo 3 – Zhou’s last journey to Tiananmen Square.
© David Zweig
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Photo 4 – A trail of mourners in Tiananmen Square: 10 January 1976. 
© David Zweig
Photo 5 – “Protecting the memory of Zhou Enlai.” 
© David Zweig
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losophy Department, got his marching orders from the vice Party secretary
of the Philosophy Department. Drafts of the posters, once written, were dis-
cussed by the criticism groups, and then after they were approved, students
with fine calligraphy drew up the posters on multi-coloured paper (Photo
2). The posters included the name of the criticism group, the date they were
posted, and a request as to how long they might be left up. In the early days
of the campaign, posters rarely lasted more than four days, but as the cam-
paign dragged on, particularly in December, posters began to fray around
the edges.
One small poster I read late one night announced that the “Big Debate on
Education” had begun after Wu De visited Tsinghua and launched the dis-
cussion in the name of Chairman Mao. Zhou Rongxin’s summer speeches
and various classified policy documents had been passed on to Chi Qun by
his allies within the Ministry of Education, which he then passed on to Zhang
Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. (21) Now excerpts from his speeches and those
documents appeared in the posters. Minister Zhou reportedly had said that
“the greatest danger in the past four years is not reading books,” and had
reportedly labelled “open door schooling” as “ultra-Leftist.” (22) Early posters
at Beida also labelled Liu Bing’s letters as “the vanguard of the rightist wind
for the reversal of verdicts blowing from all corners of society.” (23) To spread
the campaign’s attack on Zhou Rongxin off-campus, on 27 November a
group of outsiders pulled up to the compound in two trucks and a jeep and
carefully took notes from the posters. Over the next few weeks, more groups
appeared, including foreign journalists, but outside visitors increased most
dramatically in February after Deng’s name appeared in the posters. (24)
Mourning Zhou Enlai in Tiananmen Square,
10 January 1976
At the crack of dawn on 9 January, while darkness still shrouded the Beida
campus, the loudspeaker outside my room began playing a funeral dirge.
We quickly learned that China’s beloved Premier, Zhou Enlai, had died.
Throughout the dorm, the silence of our Chinese roommates was deafening.
The next day I bicycled to Tiananmen Square, where I observed long lines
of mourners, walking only two or three abreast, and bearing wreaths and
photos of Zhou Enlai that they brought to the obelisk situated at the back
end of the square (Photo 4). This monument was a meaningful locus for ho-
nouring the Premier because while the front, which faces the Gate of Heav-
enly Peace, is adorned with Mao’s massive calligraphy honouring “the
people’s heroes,” the backside, facing south towards Qianmen, bears an epi-
taph by Mao inscribed with Zhou Enlai’s calligraphy. Ironically, the obelisk
also bears huge bas-reliefs depicting eight major revolutionary episodes in
modern Chinese history. (25)
One group I watched, dressed in heavy winter garb, marched across the
square, deposited their wreath on the podium, and then withdrew, still bear-
ing Zhou’s picture (Photo 3). Despite the limits Mao had placed on the mode
of mourning for Zhou, particularly his “five no’s” – no black armbands, no
wreaths (Photo 5), no mourning halls, no memorial meetings, and no hand-
ing out of photos of the Premier – these young people wore armbands and
brought wreaths, showing that Mao’s hostility to Zhou would not dissuade
people from expressing their love for their Premier.
In fact, 30 metres south of the monument, along the tree-lined path to
Qianmen Gate, a large crowd stood weeping and lamenting, demonstrating
their sorrow to photographers who were catching this historic moment. (26)
One young man whose body was shaking as if he were a professional
mourner was called forward to make a political statement. The grief of the
women seemed to have no bounds, while most men fought back their tears
(Photos 6 to 10). Even young children, who could not possibly have under-
stood the event, were overcome by the sadness around them (Photo 11).
While Zhou had played no role in politics after Deng began his “consoli-
dation program,” and Deng was already in trouble in October, Zhou Enlai’s
death heightened the crisis. The “Big Debate on Education” became the
“Campaign to Oppose the Right Deviationist Wind.” (27) This major escalation
benefited the radicals. Mao now had to appoint someone to run the State
Council, forcing him to select Hua Guofeng over Deng and Zhang Chunqiao.
With this choice, Hua began his ascendancy to the top of the political sys-
tem. Mao, having declared that “mourning activities are in fact only a cover
for restoration” (28) and an attack on the Cultural Revolution, had made his
own mistreatment of Zhou into an issue that would come back to bite him
in late March and early April, when Chinese around the country used the
Qingming Festival to denounce the radicals, and indirectly Mao himself.
In fact, the photographs of 10 January show that while a mass outpouring
of grief at Zhou’s passing was blocked, sadness and foreboding ran deep.
The limited number of wreaths, and the fact that they were not piled very
high, suggests that people’s actions were tightly controlled. But once Zhou’s
image came under further attack in late March, the people of Beijing found
the right moment to make their political point. (29)
A Chinese New Year tour
In those days, foreign students were organised for travel within China, and
the intense political machinations notwithstanding, our cohort at Beida,
under the supervision of the Foreign Student Office (liuxuesheng bangong-
shi 留学生办公室), took off for Nanjing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Shanghai.
I looked forward to the trip with great anticipation, seeing it as an oppor-
tunity to assess the progress of the campaign against the “Right deviationist
wind” outside the capital. In fact, our trip was highly informative and dove-
tails nicely with the visual story told here. (30)
Each city contributed at least one important insight. Unlike Beida and 
Tsinghua, Nanjing University (Nanjing daxue 南京大学), one of the top
schools in China, was politically quiescent – no posters, no meetings, no
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criticism of Deng’s summer 1975 program, and no defence of the “revolu-
tion in education.” (31) Despite the radicals’ exhortation to channel grief over
Zhou’s passing into the “Campaign against the Right Deviationist Wind,”
the staff at Nanjing University were following their own tune.
At a Suzhou silk factory, the heads of two pieces of field artillery peeked
out of a garage as we walked past. During the subsequent “brief introduc-
tion” by factory officials, I asked why there were guns in the factory. The
militia, we were told, had been carrying out military activities. This infor-
mation confirmed visually that Wang Hongwen and the radicals planned
to challenge the PLA and Beijing if they came under political attack. Nev-
ertheless, after the radicals were arrested in October, the militia did not act.
The Hangzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Complex, a key centre in Deng’s
1975 battle against factionalism in Zhejiang, (32) had been home to an in-
famous “revolutionary rebel,” Weng Senhe, an ally of Wang Hongwen, who
had battled his way into the Provincial Revolutionary Committee before
being arrested in summer 1975 for “factionalism.” (33) When we arrived, a
freshly written big character poster in a back room outlined Weng’s fac-
tionalist activities. Why a group of foreign students was brought to a factory
gripped in political struggle remains unclear, unless pro-Deng forces wanted
information about the campaign against factionalism to reach foreign eyes
and ears. 
Posters displayed weeks later in the Beida compound by university leaders
presented the other side of the factional battle. One in particular claimed
that in the 20 months since “the old capitalist roader’s” return, more than
2,000 “revolutionary rebels” had been removed from office in one ministry
alone, while a Beida official in late February told foreign students that in
one district outside Beijing, all young radicals had been removed from of-
fice. (34)
Shanghai, our final stop, showed that the radicals had successfully pene-
trated the lowest levels of Shanghai’s urban society. Blackboards in “hu-
tongs,” or narrow thoroughfares, accused unnamed forces of arguing that
contemporary China was not as good as before the Cultural Revolution. (35)
In a factory we visited, workers had been encouraged to defend the “new-
born socialist things,” including “worker participation in management” and
“management participation in labour.” We were also told that in 1972, dur-
ing Zhou Enlai’s “countercurrent” (hui chao回潮) against the Cultural Rev-
olution, the workers’ university had instituted rigorous exams to prove its
credentials. But group exams had been reintroduced following the “Big De-
bate on Education” and the criticism of Zhou Rongxin. 
Attacking Deng in the posters, 
February-March 1976
In February, the posters intensified the attack on Deng, putting up many
expressions that reflected his views, albeit without mentioning him by
name. On 10 February, the famous Deng aphorism about the “colour on the
cat” appeared in the posters, (36) while another suggested that the cam-
paign’s target had declared, “You have thrown me out once; do you think
that I am afraid of being thrown out again?” 
A key target of criticism was Deng’s assertion that Mao had agreed with
the idea of “taking the three directives as the key.” Mao’s support was critical
if the documents’ policies were to be implemented. But in Mao’s eyes, Deng
should have persisted in “taking class struggle as the key” (yi jieji douzheng
wei gang以阶级斗争为纲), for to do otherwise would open the doorway for
revisionism and the revanche of capitalism. (37) Thus one poster that appeared
at this time called for the “absolute unveiling of the counterrevolutionary
essence of ‘taking the three directives as the key link’” (chedi daichuan “yi
sanxiang zhishi wei gang” de fandong shizhi彻底戴穿 “以三项指示为纲”的反
动实质). This long poster had been written by the Big Criticism Group of the
English Language Department, and drew a great deal of attention from high
school students who were brought to the compound to help spread the word
(Photo 12).
As February progressed, the radicals tried to expand the campaign outside
of Beijing. One day a camera team – a man equipped with a movie camera
and a woman who took still shots – descended on the compound. First they
went to the top floor of a dormitory overlooking the compound to get a
panoramic shot. Then they descended into the compound. Not by serendip-
ity, several busloads of high school students also visited the compound that
day, giving it an aura of enthusiasm which no doubt was captured by the
photographers. As the poster behind the fellow with the movie camera
shows (Photo 13), the radicals by this time were pushing forward the cam-
paign against Deng by displaying posters referring to an “old capitalist
roader.” 
According to Tiewes and Sun, Mao resisted efforts to attack Deng by name,
perhaps hoping that Deng would finally see the error of his ways and truly
repent. Thus on 25 February, at a month-long “warning meeting” held to in-
form provincial and regional military officials about Deng’s problem and to
outline the format for the ensuing campaign, Hua Guofeng forbade criti-
cising Deng by name. In fact, Deng’s name was not mentioned in any inter-
nal CCP document until 3 March. (38) But the duumvirate of Chi Qun and
Xie Jingyi wanted to get on with the “Criticise Deng Xiaoping Campaign”
that had been unfolding, and were more willing than the Gang of Four to
risk Mao’s wrath by naming Deng in the posters before it was authorised. In
fact, in early February, Chi Qun was attacking Deng by name in meetings of
the Standing Committee of Tsinghua University. (39)
According to rumours in Beijing, on 21 February, as former President
Richard Nixon toured the poster compound at Tsinghua University at Mao’s
suggestion, he asked Chi Qun who was this “unrepentant capitalist roader”
– a term reportedly coined by Chi Qun himself. After Chi told Nixon that it
was Deng, the cat was out of the bag and Deng’s name soon appeared in
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31. Nanjing University’s president, Kuang Yaming, was the highest ranking official in the province,
having been an underground CCP activist before the revolution. He also was quite liberal. While
in the late 1970s, leading universities such as Beida and Fudan could not arrange for foreign PhD
students to study Chinese society first hand, Nanjing University facilitated numerous theses about
rural society, agriculture, textiles, and cottage industries in Jiangsu Province. 
32. See “Hangsilian kaichan ‘yi xue, si pi, wu da jiang’ zuo jiaoyu yundong qingyan” (The Experience
of the Hangzhou Silk Complex in Carrying Out the “One Study, Four Criticisms, Five Big Debates”
Self-Education Movement), Xuexi wenji (Collected Study Materials), No. 5, 1975, printed by the
Zhejiang Provincial People’s Publishing House, which reprinted articles from Zhejiang Daily. I
bought these study materials on the street, which suggests that they were being widely distributed
in the city.
33. Keith Forster, “Spontaneous and Institutional Rebellion in the Cultural Revolution: The Extraordi-
nary Case of Weng Senhe,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27, 1992, pp. 39-75.
34. David S. Zweig, “The Peita Debate on Education and the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p’ing,” art. cit., p. 151.
35. A key phrase was jin bu ru xi, or “the present is not as good as the past.”
36. The phrase, “bu guan bai mao hei mao, neng zhua laoshu jiu shi hao mao” (It doesn’t matter
whether the cat is black or white, so long as it can catch the mouse it is a good cat) was a phrase
Deng first used in 1962 to support dividing up the collective land to resolve the ongoing famine. 
37. Ann Elizabeth Fenwick, The Gang of Four and the Politics of Opposition: China, 1971-1976, op.
cit., p. 422. In early January, when the Beida basketball team, of which I was a member, met to
“beat back the Right deviationist wind,” I had to explain to my team mates why the former view
was a “revisionist doctrine.” 
38. Fred Tiewes and Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics in the Twilight of the Cul-
tural Revolution, 1972-1976, op. cit., p. 448.
39. Ibid., p. 452.
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Photo essay
Photo 6 – Shaken to the core 
at Zhou’s passing. © David Zweig
Photo 7 – Fighting back tears in front of
the obelisk. © David Zweig
Photo 8 – A young woman weeps.
© David Zweig
A collage of mourners at the back of Tiananmen Square, 10 January 1976
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Photo 9 – Sisters in sadness stand out from the crowd. 
© David Zweig
Photo 10 – Like losing one’s father. 
© David Zweig
Photo 11 – A young boy and his mother mourn
together. © David Zweig
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Photo 12 – Deng’s “Three Directives” under attack 
at Peking University, February 1976. © David Zweig
Photo 13 – Trying to extend the Pi Deng cam-
paign outside of Beijing’s campuses © David Zweig
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Photo 14 – Deng, that unrepentant “capitalist roader,” is on the road again.  
© David Zweig
Photo 15 – Capitulating to 
Capitalism: Deng as a contem-
porary Song Jiang. © David Zweig
Photo 16 – Deng stands accused at Peking University.
© David Zweig
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posters in the compounds, even though there had still been no official ap-
proval.
So on 26 February, before the Politburo or Mao authorised it, posters that
had previously only referred to an unnamed “capitalist roader” were sud-
denly emblazoned with strips of paper pasted right across the posters bear-
ing phrases such as “Deng Xiaoping is in fact the unrepentant capitalist
roader” (Deng Xiaoping jiu shi dang nei de zui da de zouzipai邓小平就是党
内的最大的走资派 ). New posters also declared, “Deng Xiaoping is the
biggest unrepentant capitalist roader in the Communist Party” (Photo 14).
One posted on 26 February by the “Big Criticism Group of the Literature
Department” accused Deng of being a modern day Song Jiang, the hero
in the classic Chinese novel, Water Margin, whom Mao had called a “ca-
pitulationist” in 1973 and in 1975 (Photo 15). So now the students were
comparing Deng to one of Mao’s least favourite literary characters. In
line with the penchant in Chinese politics to list the “crimes” of leaders
under attack – Hu Yaobang would be accused of “16 great crimes” in
1986, while Zhao Ziyang was charged with “10 great crimes” in 1988 –
herein Deng faced “eight great accusations” (ba da zuizhuang 八大罪状)
(Photo 16).
Towards the April Fifth Movement
At end of March, Shanghai’s leading newspaper, Wen Hui Bao文汇报, car-
ried a front page article that was widely, if erroneously, interpreted as an
accusation that Zhou Enlai was the “capitalist roader within the Party who
wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain power.” (40) Accord-
ing to Tiewes and Sun, the Politburo radicals had no intention of attacking
Zhou; their target was Deng and supporters he had rehabilitated over the
past years. Nevertheless, the idea that the radicals wanted to attack Zhou
on the eve of the Qingming Festival mobilised the city of Nanjing, whose
students and citizens launched an assault on the Gang of Four and Zhang
Chunqiao in particular. Even employees at the Nanjing train station let stu-
dents paint the sides of trains going to Shanghai and Beijing. (41) These
protests spread quickly to 14 provinces and two provincial-level cities. (42)
Near the end of March, wreaths began to reappear on the Monument to
the People’s Heroes in Beijing, the place where citizens had mourned Zhou
in January. (43)
40. Ibid., p. 468.
41. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao, op. cit., pp. 111-113, and Genny Louie and Kam
Louie, “The Role of Nanjing University in the Nanjing Incident,” art. cit., p. 340. 
42. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao, op. cit., pp. 114-115.
43. According to Fred Tiewes and Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics in the Twi-
light of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976, op. cit., the first wreath appeared on 24 March. 
Photo essay
Photo 17 – Organising high schoolers on 3 April. 
© David Zweig
Photo 18 – Standing with Zhou Enlai on 3 April. 
© Jeremy Paltiel
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A rainy day on Tiananmen Square, 
3 April 1976
My fellow Canadian student, Jeremy Paltiel, and I biked to Tiananmen
Square on Saturday, 3 April, the day before Qingming. It was a rainy and
eerie day on the square, and the weather matched the mood. Some people
were unfriendly to foreigners, unlike the following day when people in the
square wanted foreign help to get their views out to the world. A battle
seemed underway for control of the square. Jeremy and I saw two people
argue below the obelisk when suddenly a man who had been reading the
back of a wreath was surrounded by a group that drove him right off the
square into the road beside the Great Hall of the People. Still, the wreaths
were piled high, though they would go higher on the morrow. 
The three black and white photos of the obelisk taken Saturday are from
three different angles (Photos 25, 26, and 27). One, from the rear, shows
Zhou Enlai’s essay, which made the obelisk a good place to mourn his passing
(Photo 26). Another, from the side, shows the podium brimming with wreaths
(Photo 27), while a third shows the mass of people that had formed on the
north side of the obelisk where the wreaths spilled off the podium on both
sides (Photo 25). As another photo taken south of the obelisk, near Qianmen,
shows, high school students wearing Young Pioneers armbands, and forcefully
organised by a PLA officer (Photo 17), sang songs, marched and saluted.
Tiananmen Square as a transmission channel
Just as the radicals had used the poster compounds at universities they con-
trolled to air publicly their hostility to Deng’s reform program, largely in the hope
that it would force the hand of the Politburo and trigger a nationwide campaign,
popular resistance to the radicals in late March and early April 1976 used the
celebration of the Qingming Festival in Tiananmen Square as their medium for
expressing hostility to the radicals and to the future that they (and Mao) had in
store for China. Thus many wreaths that were placed in the square had poems
critical of the radicals stuck on the back (Photo 28); other short essays and poems
were stuck directly on the façade of the obelisk itself (Photo 19).
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Photo 19 – Small message, big crowd. 
© David Zweig
Thus, as the pictures displayed here show (Photos 20 to 23), despite the
rain on Saturday, people went to great efforts to glean information from the
poems and mini-essays. Some virtually hung upside down to get access, as
space in front of the notes was overloaded with people. But whether hanging
upside down or standing right-side up or leaning in over people’s shoulders,
Beijingers scribbled away, becoming nodes or networks between the voices
in the square and a Beijing society that hungered to know what others dared
to think. The coloured slide from Sunday (Photo 28) shows how these mes-
sages drew people to the wreaths, becoming a channel for cryptic critiques
of the radicals and of Mao, which Mao and the Politburo radicals, especially
Jiang Qing, wanted to shut down. Even for some moderate leaders, an attack
on Politburo members was an attack on the CCP itself. Thus as one photo
shows, a longish text on the side of the obelisk was pasted next to carvings
of peasant revolutionaries from China’s past, as if facilitating communication
between generations of Chinese rebels (Photo 24).
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Photo 20 – Rain doesn’t stop the readers. 
© David Zweig
Photo 22 – Hanging in to figure it out. 
© David Zweig
Photo 21 – Coming at the message from above and below. 
© David Zweig
Sunday on the Square, 4 April
The atmosphere on Sunday morning had changed significantly from the
day before. I saw no disagreements, as people appeared united in opposing
“Khrushchev-like criminals who sought to usurp power,” a reference to
Zhang Chunqiao that was frequently uttered on the square that Sunday. (44)
People and wreaths were everywhere, running from the obelisk all the way
to Chang’an Avenue (see the cover photo).
Chinese often think that it is dangerous to stand out (or up), as social or
political forces will either punish you or drive you back down. But this day,
in the northeast section of the square, people rose up continuously from
within the crowd, reading prepared texts or making impromptu speeches.
One young railroad worker (45) stood above the crowd, expressing support
for Zhou Enlai. With his own blood, he had written a “letter of determina-
tion” (juexin shu 决心书) to the late Premier on his own t-shirt, which he
held up with his bandaged hand for all to see. A man beside him read the
text that had been scrawled in blood on his shirt (Photo 30). His persona
was magnetic, pulling the assembled mass towards him (Photo 29), and
when he raised the t-shirt, the crowd roared with approval. As he prepared
to descend, people shouted his name and reached up to touch him. Then
everyone sang The Internationale.
People from all social circles appeared on the square that day. According
to Yao Wenyuan, one of the radicals, children of high-ranking cadres were
deeply involved in that day’s events. (46) My photo of a young man wearing
a camera around his neck corroborates this point (Photo 31). According to
Garside, high-ranking officials had their pictures taken with the wreaths,
while Wang Hongwen looked over the square from Tiananmen Gate to as-
sess this challenge to the image of the radicals and Mao. (47) Grandfathers
dressed in peasants’ garb carried their grandsons on their backs (Photo 32).
Children’s faces appeared all around the square and up on the obelisk, beau-
tifully framed by the wreaths (Photo 33). One man, dressed in a traditional
Chinese jacket, claimed to be a factory worker, though he was probably an
engineer. His poem, which was taped by a journalist nearby, was full of
gloom (Photo 35):
The sound of mourning stops the earth from turning, and tears have
no end.
The dark heaven is crying and beating its own breast. 
The earth is also shouting to move heaven.
If tears accompany the sad song, the song will be even sadder.
If sadness accompanies the hot tears, the tears will flow still more.
Even after the sunset, there will be a dawn,
But after the star has fallen, there will be no light.
The mountains are falling, the world is collapsing,
Grief is like a sea of turbulent tears.
The world is dark and the sky has fallen low.
The north wind blows fiercely and the earth is overturned. (48)
Before stepping down, he shouted: “We will fight back against anyone who
attacks our Zongli,” and raising his arm, he declared “Long Live Premier
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44. Genny Louie and Kam Louie, “The Role of Nanjing University in the Nanjing Incident,” op. cit.,
say that this phrase was widely used in Nanjing as well. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after
Mao, op. cit., has eight entries for “Khrushchev-like careerists” in his Index. 
45. Garside seems to refer to the same young man with the bandaged hand whose picture appears
here. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao, op. cit., p. 124. 
46. Fred Tiewes and Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics in the Twilight of the Cul-
tural Revolution, 1972-1976, op. cit., p. 474.
47. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao, op. cit., p. 125, and Fred Tiewes and Warren Sun,
The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics in the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976,
op. cit,. p. 479, respectively.
48. David S. Zweig, “The Peita Debate on Education and the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p’ing,” art. cit., p. 155.
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Photo 23 – Making a point others want to share. 
© David Zweig
Photo 24 – Speaking to the heroes of the past. 
© David Zweig
Zhou!” Many arms shot up around him as a chorus exclaimed “Long Live
Premier Zhou!” Another verse of The Internationale followed. One artist,
who set up his easel at the far north of the square, right below Tiananmen
Gate, painted the amazing crowd and drew the attention of another man
who watched him work (Photo 36).
At one point, a well-dressed woman put a vase with some flowers on
of the columns at the north end of the square (Photo 37). The couplet
running down the vase’s sides announced that the flowers had been
sent by the “Revolutionary Professors of Peking University,” which gen-
erated much excitement, as it suggested that even faculty in that
hotbed of “Leftism” dissented from the radical agenda. My camera shut-
ter caught her as she moved quickly through the crowd, almost as if
she had planted a bomb and wanted to get away from it before it blew
up.
One group missing from the square, and therefore from my photos, was
the security forces. Undoubtedly, the square must have been crawling with
plain-clothed police, but there was no presence of uniformed police. Still,
lots of people stood on wagons and on the carved marble posts just below
Tiananmen Gate, taking photographs (Photo 34), while others walked
around with cameras.
One poem I copied down greatly frightened my roommate when I read it
to him that night back in our dorm. Apparently, a big debate had ensued
about whether to build Zhou a mausoleum, and while Mao had opposed
that idea, the popular view among the citizenry was that the Politburo rad-
icals were the primary opponents of such a memorial hall, a message clearly
articulated in the following poem:
The ashes are not yet cold.
Song oppresses the sounds of sadness.
There is an empty seat on the stage.
All the people look towards Qing Ming
But at Qing Ming there is no grave to sweep.
Annoyingly they look to the empty sky
The ashes have been spread across the country’s soil. (49)
We hope that the gentleman’s clear spirit
Will become an insecticide
To destroy all mosquitos and flies. (50)
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49. Zhou’s ashes were spread across the country and in the Taiwan Straits.
50. This poem first appeared in David S. Zweig, “The Peita Debate on Education and the Fall of Teng
Hsiao-p’ing,” art. cit., p. 157.
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Photo 25 – The wreaths rise high on the obelisk on 3 April: A view from Chang’an Avenue. 
© David Zweig
The denouement to 4 April
In the early morning of 5 April, at Jiang Qing’s insistence, (51) and without
Mao’s input, the wreaths were removed and some people were arrested for
resisting the army’s effort to clean up the square. On that same day, Mao
authorised the use of force. But although tens of thousands of furious Bei-
jingers poured back into the square after word emerged that city officials
had confiscated all the wreaths, and engaged in riotous behaviour such as
overturning a police van and setting fire to a command post on the
square, (52) the People’s Militia hesitated to act, attacking people only after
10:30 pm and for only 10 to 15 minutes. (53) The limited force notwithstand-
ing, the memory of state and CCP violence against the people was irrevo-
cably etched in the PRC’s history.
On Wednesday, 7 April, the Politburo unanimously approved a proposal
by Mao that Hua Guofeng be made first Vice-Chairman of the CCP and keep
his post as Premier. Deng, on the other hand, was stripped of all his posts
and blamed for fomenting a counterrevolutionary event. But as they did
not revoke his Party membership, he would have the chance for his last and
most influential comeback a little more than one year later. 
Conclusion
I often ask my students, “What single event best explains the success of
Deng’s post-1978 reforms?” They are always puzzled. But the events of this
tumultuous period, from the convening of the National People’s Congress
in January 1975 until the death of Mao on 9 September 1976, demonstrate
that Deng’s post-1978 reforms would have failed were Mao still alive. Thus,
the answer to the question is: the death of Mao.
Yet the events in Tiananmen Square on 4 and 5 April already heralded sig-
nificant changes to the political system that Mao built, even before the
Chairman died physically. In fact, some viewed it as the beginning of “de-
Maoification” even before Mao was deceased. (54) The Chinese people had
tired of the tumultuous politics that Mao loved; they hungered for stability
and economic development. For them, Zhou Enlai, not Mao, best reflected
their social, political, and economic interests. Perhaps Mao understood that
Zhou’s moderate politics and his support for the Four Modernisations
threatened Mao’s authority and popularity; hence his mistreatment of Zhou
while the Prime Minister lived, his insulting treatment of Zhou after he
passed away, and his refusal to allow large-scale mourning by the Chinese
people.
In reflecting on this major crisis in Chinese politics, where the citizenry
participated autonomously on a massive scale and demonstrated hostility
to important members of the ruling elite, we can consider what triggered
this explosion and whether it has any lessons for China’s future. Several
points stand out.
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51. Tiewes and Sun say that Jiang Qing was the strongest advocate of sending in troops and quickly
clearing the square, in part because so many of the wreaths attacked her. Fred Tiewes and Warren
Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics in the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-
1976, op. cit., pp. 479-480.
52. Garside describes the events in the square on 5 April. See Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after
Mao, op. cit., pp. 157-164.
53. I believe that there are few photos of the riot in the West, as anyone with a camera had their film
torn out. Fortunately, I did not go to the square on the 5th, so my film from the 4th was not con-
fiscated. 
54. Claude Cadart and Chen Yingxiang, Les Deux morts de Mao Tsé-toung. Commentaires pour
"Tian’an men l'Empourprée" de Hua Linshan (Mao Zedong’s Two Deaths. Comments on Hua 
Linshan’s “Now-turned Purple Tiananmen”), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1977.
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Photo 26 – Zhou Enlai’s writing on the back of the obelisk. 
© David Zweig
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Photo 30 – The man who wrote in blood.  
© David Zweig
Photo 31 – Speaking for the interests of the elite.
© David Zweig
Photo 32 – An old man with his grandson.
© David Zweig
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Photo 33 – A young boy ponders Zhou and China’s future.  
© David Zweig
Photo 34 – Cameras clicking, but to what end?  
© David Zweig
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First, this was a time of leadership transition brought on by the death of
Zhou Enlai. Mao’s health was also fading rapidly, creating a political vacuum
over which different factions would engage in fierce political combat. In-
tense factional struggle, in fact, a “no-holds-barred” battle for ultimate
power, emerged, as both sides showed limited concern about civil inner-
party struggle. In fact, the struggle ended only with the arrest of one of the
key groups of protagonists.
Second, this period saw the coexistence of two opposing policy lines that
both had a chance for ascendancy. A Leftist future for China, based on norms
of the Cultural Revolution, was challenged by the possibility of China’s own
political spring. After the Fourth National People’s Congress, Zhou’s mod-
erate line – based on the “Four Modernisations” – and Deng’s “consolida-
tion” program gained wide popularity, what Fenwick called “the arousal of
unprecedented spontaneous popular response to the Gang’s agenda.” (55) In
fact, many people hoped that Zhou and Deng’s line would win. So when
Mao intervened by attacking Deng’s reform program, and the Politburo rad-
icals and their allies moved into a dominant position, Chinese society struck
a blow for rational politics, economic development, and social stability.
The same held true for the student protests of fall 1986 and the second
Tiananmen crisis of 1989. The year 1986 began with a strong push from re-
formist forces. The summer of 1986 may have been the freest moment in
post-1949 China. But at the Beidaihe Meeting in August that year, the CCP
passed a resolution calling for the advancement of “spiritual civilisation”
(jingshen wenming精神文明), a code word for strengthening Party leader-
ship and pro-communist behaviour. 
For four months competing trends coexisted, as despite this manifestation
of Leftist power, forces favouring serious political reform intensified, even
from within the CCP. So, when political protests erupted in Hefei, much like
the anti-Gang of Four protests in Nanjing in March 1976, students took to
the street in Shanghai and Beijing, and in the latter case were arrested when
they marched into Tiananmen Square.
June Fourth had the same feel. The 13th Party Congress of fall 1987 had
been the high point of political reform in the entire reform era. But Zhao
Ziyang and the reform faction confronted deep trouble after the lifting of
planned prices in summer 1988 triggered a popular panic. Li Peng, Yao Yilin,
and other conservatives denounced Zhao for a liturgy of crimes. But the stu-
dents, in response to the death and mistreatment of Hu Yaobang, challenged
the Left in the CCP and brought on a political crisis. This time they occupied
Tiananmen Square for almost a month before they were violently driven out.
Today, China does not face a succession crisis. We hear few moderate
voices from within the CCP. We see no deep factional struggle, and little
room for political reform. Xi Jinping has proposed a radical economic pro-
gram, but rather than face an obvious challenge from the “Left,” Xi confronts
only foot-dragging and policy resistance. Moreover, Xi’s Third Plenum pro-
gram has failed to galvanise Chinese society in the same way as Zhou Enlai
and Deng’s 1975 program or Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang’s vision for the
1980s. People may speculate about what could happen if Xi fails, but the
patterns of the past suggest that a popular revolt is not on the horizon. Nor
do communist systems have a history of purging the top leader. Neverthe-
less, as these pictures show, we should never underestimate the capacity
of the Chinese people to find ways to strike a blow for reform.
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